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Europeanisation, for obvious reasons, has often been discussed in tandem with 
transnationalisation. It is therefore relevant to ask whether de-Europeanisation entails de-
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One of the many misleading slogans repeated by the Brexiteers is that the UK is 
‘leaving the European Union but not leaving Europe’. This is true in a geographical 
sense but occludes the prospect of the radical breaking of a whole set of practical and 
ideational ties with the rest of Europe.2 It should be remembered that Theresa May’s 
initial animus, while she was Home Secretary, was against the European Human 
Rights regime rather than the EU, and a shadow hangs over the UK’s adherence 
to this and other institutions which it helped to create in the post-war years. The 
claim is made that the UK could sustain a respectable human rights regime without 
reference to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), just as it could 
run an economy with EU standards of product safety, consumer protection and so on 
without reference to the EU, but there is a similar failure to recognise the difference 
between collectively agreed and administered arrangements/understandings and those 
which, like Stalinist parliaments, merely simulated them.3
The most chilling scenario was one in which the UK used its freedom to create 
an offshore economy with unilateral free trade and a reliance primarily on financial 
services. If this scenario seems unrealistic, it is worth remembering that it was used 
as a threat in the event of the UK’s failure to reach an agreement with the EU by 
Philip Hammond – the economics minister in May’s cabinet – usually seen as one 
of the saner members of the UK government. With wages plummeting, agriculture 
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ceasing to exist on the territory of the UK and massive unemployment, the surplus 
population would have to be managed by increasingly authoritarian means, perhaps 
dressed up as a British version of national socialism. Something like this scenario still 
seems to be on the agenda of the illegally funded Conservative ‘Europe Research 
Group’.4 It is of course possible to conceive a cosier Brexit scenario of egalitarianism, 
superlative welfare provision and social tolerance, of the kind that would appeal to 
Jeremy Corbyn and perhaps to a majority of the electorate. There is however no 
prospect of this being economically viable in a UK/England isolated from the global 
economy. The UK missed its chance of becoming something like Norway in the 
later 20th century when North Sea oil opened a window of opportunity. It opted 
instead for Thatcherism.
Since my argument in this article is largely critical of the role played in the EU by 
the UK and, to some extent, other member states, it is appropriate to mention here an 
alternative analysis which would argue that it is in fact the EU that threatens national 
democracy and is substantially responsible for the current upsurge of populist politics in 
Europe. This line of argument carries particular weight in a state like the UK, which 
lacks a written constitution and is often described as an ‘elective dictatorship’ with few 
restraints on the powers of the Parliament (which in practice means the executive). 
(It can also of course be argued that this makes EU membership particularly valuable 
for a state like the UK.) Arguments framed in terms of sovereignty and (national) 
democracy have, however, a wider application and have been presumed, for example, 
by the German Constitutional Court in its ‘Solange II’ judgement of 1987 that ‘so 
long as the European Communities … generally ensure an effective protection of 
fundamental rights … the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its 
jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation’.5 
The case for taking sovereignty seriously has been well made by Stefan Auer (2017) 
in his contribution to a volume I edited on Brexit (Outhwaite, 2017; see also, on 
sovereignty in relation to Article 50, Dixon, 2018).
The rather tiresome and self-congratulatory discussion of ‘European values’ in much 
of the literature suggests that it is important to avoid an over-normative conception 
of what is European or anti-European, as in the parallel conception of the ‘(un)-
American’, overlain with the shadow of Senator McCarthy (Kuhn, 2011; Delhey 
et al, 2014). If capital punishment, for example, is un-European, I would prefer to 
say that this is because it is excluded by the legal-political institutions of European 
states rather than because it conflicts with some nebulous set of values, even if that 
was the basis of the original political decision to forbid it. Europeanisation, as it was 
rather problematically applied to post-communist Europe (what else, if not European, 
were they before?), was however understood, for good reasons, to mean not just the 
acquis communautaire and related practices but a whole range of norms and practical 
understandings expected to prevail in the processes of transition and accession.6 
How far this went has often been questioned: in politics, in particular, the Leninist 
conception of ‘kto kovo’ (who screws who) often persisted or was revived, as currently 
in Poland and Hungary.7 The Union’s inability or unwillingness to back its principles 
by legal means, in a complicated situation of a gradual step-by-step move towards 
authoritarianism (‘salami tactics’) by ruling parties, makes clear that Article 7 is not 
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3
a guarantee of good practice (Ágh, 2017).8 Outside the framework of the EU and 
the ECHR, however, all bets are off, with the UN having much more egregious 
behaviour to concern itself with on a world scale.
Europeanisation often refers, among other things, to the interaction of national 
institutions with European ones (vertical) or with equivalent institutions in other 
national states in a European context (horizontal). Vertical integration would include, 
for example, national ministers in the Council, national civil servants participating 
in policy making in the Commission and the other institutions, and judges and 
advocates-general (and their staff) in the Court. There are more ad-hoc arrangements 
for the interaction of parliamentarians, though for a long time it was common in some 
countries for politicians to be members of the European Parliament (EP) as well as 
their national parliaments (and sometimes mayors as well). There are of course formal 
arrangements for local scrutiny of legislation and other EU matters, such as the House 
of Lords Committees in the UK. Similarly, in the early years it was quite common 
for national courts to refer questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), but 
as its case law has developed and become better known this became less common.
Leaving the EU means breaking off all these vertical links and removes access to the 
structures that mediate horizontal interaction. For a ‘third country’ with no prospect 
of accession, dealings with the EU are basically a matter of foreign ministries. It is of 
course possible that in some areas the practice of a post-Brexit UK would converge 
with that of the EU, as with, for example, the convergence of foreign and diplomatic 
services across Europe analysed (though of course in an EU frame) by Brian Hocking 
and David Spence (2005), but there would no longer be any expectation of this. The 
only exception would be what is explicitly prescribed for trade arrangements and 
possibly others to do with security.
Europeanisation, for obvious reasons, has often been discussed in tandem with 
transnationalisation.9 It is therefore relevant to ask whether de-Europeanisation 
entails de-transnationalisation, or what elements of the transnational persist outside 
the EU framework. First, it may be useful to distinguish between soft and hard 
de-Europeanisation in relation to the EU. What I mean by the first is a process in 
which a member state diverges from the general European pattern, either through 
some agreed process of derogation, which may of course be justified as a way of 
improving flexibility and diversity (Chalmers et al, 2016: especially 6–7), or through 
the gradual and possibly surreptitious unilateral abandonment of common European 
norms, practices or understandings. In the second case, a decision is taken to withdraw 
entirely from the EU or to abandon the path of accession. Examples of the first would 
be the UK’s emergency withdrawal in 1992 from the European Monetary System 
in an earlier collapse of the pound, or the gradual erosion of constitutional rule in 
Poland and Hungary in the middle of the present decade. Examples of the second 
case are the UK and Turkey – both accompanied (to different degrees) with a shift 
towards state authoritarianism and increasingly shrill propaganda, some of it directed 
against the judiciary and academic and other institutions.10
The Nordic and Swiss cases are particularly interesting in this connection (see 
Nielsen, 2018). Greenland, like the UK, voted to leave what is now the EU, having a 
decade earlier voted not to join but been dragged in through its union with Denmark. 
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It remains closely associated with the EU as an overseas territory, as its union with 
Denmark becomes ‘ever looser’ (Gad, 2017 {Not in References})11 Greenland’s 
rejection of EU membership was substantially driven by the desire to control its fishing, 
but this inevitably intersected with questions of sovereignty and national identity, 
the latter defined in opposition to distant Denmark. Greenland’s small population 
of just over 56,000 makes it a special case, but it is also one of four post-Danish 
nations, along with the Faroes (also an autonomous region of Denmark), Norway and 
Iceland, which became independent in 1905 and 1944 respectively (Neumann, 2014; 
Jonsdottir, 2013). These longstanding concerns were already present in discussion of 
EFTA membership in 1970 and continued in relation to the European Economic 
Area (Thorhallsson 2015: 119 {Not in References}). Iceland’s application for EU 
membership in 2009, after the collapse of its banks, was paused in 2013 and for the 
moment seems like a blip in an otherwise limited and transactional relationship.
Norway’s membership applications in 1972 and again in 1994 confronted vigorous 
opposition movements, echoing much earlier opposition to Scandinavianist projects.12 
Accounts of the 1972 referendum, such as the brilliant one by Iver Neumann 
(2002), could be easily read over into 2016 in the UK, with half-hearted support for 
membership confronting a diffuse combination of anticapitalist egalitarianism and 
nativism (Pharo 1993: 255–256 {Not in References}). Lene Hansen (2002: 22) 
{Not in References} notes that in both Norway and Denmark, it was argued that 
‘“objective” economic analysis should be considered part of an attempt to intimidate 
the voters’ – again prefiguring the Brexit campaign. With Norway’s membership of 
the EEA, however, ‘Some claim that the Norwegian “No” campaigners won in 1994 
but have lost a little every day since then’ (Eriksen 2015: 77 {Not in References}).13 
Lene Hansen (2002: 21) {Not in References} suggests, however, that ‘The biggest 
difference in terms of the populations’ view of the EU runs … not between Norway 
and the rest of the Nordics, but between Finland on the one hand and the “reluctant 
three” on the other.’14 This suggests a possible future in which Finland continues 
to Europeanise, while Norway weakens its links with the EU and, in the middle, 
Denmark and Sweden resist further integration (assuming this takes place). Here 
the euro is likely to be the central concern, with Sweden committed in theory to 
adopt it sometime or other and Denmark having an indefinite opt-out but currently 
pegging its krone to the euro.15
Switzerland has a longer history as an independent state. The diversity of this 
small country partly explains its reticence about joining the EEA in 1992, when 
the French-speaking part of the country voted in favour and the German and 
Italian regions against. The EU has been ‘the most divisive issue in Switzerland and 
has helped to polarize and ideologize the Swiss party system in a way which has 
not happened in Norway’ (Church 2007: 2 {Not in References}).16 The result 
of the Swiss EEA referendum suggests the emergence of a familiar ‘Inglehartian’ 
polarisation between openness and tradition, with the yes campaign stressing on 
the one hand the ‘cultural’ issues to do with avoiding isolation and opening up to 
the new Europe, and on the other the economic advantages of the EEA. These 
arguments were reversed by those opposing membership. Fifteen years later, Lachat 
and Kriesi (2007) {Not in References} traced the broader pattern across Western 
European politics of ‘the transformation of the cultural dimension’. In the UK, as 
in Switzerland, free movement has become a sticking point, though neither country 
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can do without very substantial migration flows, whatever the preferences of their 
more xenophobic citizens.17
Non-membership in the Norwegian and Swiss cases does not in any case mean 
the absence of transnational regulation (Lavenex, 2011). For the rest of the world, or 
most of it, outside the Union, WTO regulations form another structure regulating 
the actions of national states. Although formally the WTO is intergovernmental, in 
practice it can better be understood as a weak form of transnationalism. The WTO 
has currently 164 members and an outer circle of observers; only Turkmenistan and 
North Korea remain outside. The world human rights regime centred on the United 
Nations is another external sphere, though only the European Court of Human Rights 
deals with actions brought by individuals as well as states. An important part of the 
background is what Anne-Marie Slaughter (1997: 192) called the ‘nationalization 
of international law’, in which ‘Transgovernmental networks allow governments to 
benefit from the flexibility and decentralization of nonstate actors’ (p 195).
The Brexit fantasy of independence is, then, just that, even in the extreme scenario 
of a ‘hard Brexit’ with no agreed arrangements with the EU. In the European 
case, of course, nationalisation tends to mean ‘spill-back’ from Europe to member 
states. It is important not to fetishise the ‘community method’ and mistrust under 
all circumstances more intergovernmental approaches such as the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), or to assume that a European policy will in all cases be superior 
to one independently introduced by member (or for that matter non-member) 
states. On the other hand, there are dangers in being too flexible. As Paul Cardwell 
(2018: 73) has argued in relation to migration, in a context of innovative and perhaps 
expedient approaches under the heading of ‘new governance’, which allow greater 
discretion in implementation, ‘there is a real risk that the values the EU upholds are 
undermined, in turn losing credibility both with populations in the member states, 
international organisations and third countries.’
A brake on Europeanisation or an experiment with de-Europeanisation in 
this modest sense would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. I shall 
concentrate here on more broadly-based proposals for what has been called ‘de-
constitutionalisation’ of the EU. The term de-constitutionalisation was used in a 
rather different sense by Barrus et al (2004), but its present use can be traced back to 
Ralf Dahrendorf ’s ‘Reflections on the Revolution in Europe’, in which he warned 
post-communist societies against constitutionalising issues of, for example, economic 
management which should be discussed in a more open framework (Dahrendorf, 
1990: 32) {Not in References – 1973?}. Dahrendorf wanted a constitution for 
what in 1973 he was already calling a ‘European Union’, but ‘a constitution for 
democrats’ (Dahrendorf, 1973: 209–234). João Carlos Espada (2014) picked up the 
Dahrendorfian theme, and the Madisonian one which inspired Barrus et al (2004), 
to address what he called ‘The Missing Debate’ around the speed and direction of 
European integration.18
The constitutional identity of the EU was demonstrated by Joseph Weiler (1999) 
in the late 1990s and in a major book edited by Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 
(2006) {Not in References}. Dieter Grimm, in essays reprinted in Grimm (2016), 
repeatedly criticised the constitutionalisation of economic policy in the EU and the 
difficulty of mobilising resistance to it among member states. While not opposed in 
principle to constitutionalisation and even to a federal EU, he insists that the Treaties 
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should be limited to setting an institutional framework, with policy issues dealt with 
in secondary law (Grimm, 2016: 45).
Hauke Brunkhorst (2013) also addressed ‘the fatal simultaneity of constitutionalization 
and deconstitutionalization of the union’, a theme that he has pursued in subsequent 
work. Most recently, Fritz Scharpf (2017: 334), who had earlier coined the term ‘joint 
decision trap’ (Verflechtungsfalle), has argued that de-constitutionalisation is the key to 
the further democratisation of multilevel governance in the EU and ‘loosening the 
stranglehold of constitutionalised neoliberalism’. In practical terms, he restates his 
earlier suggestion (Scharpf, 1999) of regularising the approval of opt-outs for states that 
do not wish to participate in common policies, by majority votes in the Parliament 
and Council. This otherwise attractive proposal confronts an obstacle in the form of 
what Michael Zürn (2017: 280) has termed a ‘democratic paradox’ in which people 
trust independent bodies such as constitutional courts more than parliaments:
while participatory democracy requires a constitutionalized system of rule 
in which especially the coordination of governance and the delegation of 
authorities is democratically controlled, the people who, in principle, are 
in favor of democracy trust especially non-majoritarian institutions that are 
beyond the reach of majoritarian institutions.
In the background is the factual diversity of the EU itself: not in the sense of a 
happy interplay of linguistic and cultural differences but in persisting inequalities 
and polarisations that make a mockery of its cohesion policies. Magone et al (2016) 
point out in their concluding chapter that ‘In the EU of six, the only serious core-
periphery divide was the north-south divide within Italy.’ This is perhaps an over-
statement, since many if not all of the original six had much less extreme forms of 
internal differentiation (though in Belgium and West Germany the regional relations 
of inequality were becoming reversed). The underlying point is however that the EU 
today remains unequal and divided in ways that were pointed up {unsure what’s 
meant by this – already in existence?} and massively exacerbated by the 2008 
economic crisis.19 There are many dimensions to this imperfect Europeanisation, but 
two are fundamental. The euro, which was intended inter alia to unite the peoples 
of Europe and in some ways has done so, also sharpened economic divisions, while 
over-optimistic expectations for the further democratisation of the former communist 
states were dashed by more and more instances of ‘backsliding’, to which the Union 
has often turned a blind eye.
This reality is too complex to be squeezed into a have/have-not or core/periphery 
model, and even Magone et al (2016: Conclusion) stress that ‘The character of the 
core-periphery divide in the Union is multi-layered and multi-faceted.’ It remains 
the case, however, that on the whole the North-West is economically and politically 
in a reasonable state, while the South and East are more problematic. This picture 
has of course to be qualified with the Irish blip, the UK catastrophe and a certain 
shadow over Austria and France’s future, and also with impressive performance in 
pockets of the South and East.
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I turn now to discuss in more detail two concepts related to de-Europeanisation: ‘dis-
integration’ (using the hyphen to indicate the reverse or reversing of integration rather 
than something more catastrophic) and ‘differentiated integration’. Hans Vollaard 
(2018: 123), who has been one of the few people, along with Ben Rosamond, to 
address the issue of dis-integration, very creatively runs the Rokkan-Bartolini model 
of state and EU formation in reverse, focusing in particular on the EU’s inability to 
hold its member states in check and the way in which, so far as it does manage this, 
it destabilises those states and stirs up resistance to the point of demands for exit in 
the political fringes or, in the UK, the mainstream right. Thus ‘the same factor can 
be both conducive to integration and disintegration’. He stresses, however, that dis-
integration does not necessarily mean reversion to independent national states (as 
the UK belatedly realised in 2016–18) and there is a variety of partial exit options 
(p 150).20
Opt-outs are one of the weakest forms of de-Europeanisation or, better, multiple-
mode Europeanisation or ‘differentiated integration’, a term that has been in use on 
and off since the 1980s and was foreshadowed in the Tindemans Report of 1974 
(Stubb, 1996; Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Leuffen et al, 2013; Winzen 
and Schimmelfennig, 2016). The relevant aspects here are not the temporal delays 
intentionally built into eurozone membership or free movement but opt-outs from 
common policies and the more dramatic prospect, favoured by many German 
commentators, of a semi-permanent division between a more integrated core and a 
less integrated periphery or set of peripheries. As John Erik Fossum (2015: 800) has 
pointed out, it would be better to speak of differentiation in cases where the intention 
is to avoid for the foreseeable future measures adopted by other member states.
The most prominent examples of opt-outs are perhaps Denmark and the UK, 
unless one includes the states that have rejected EU membership but arranged 
association through the EEA or related arrangements (Outhwaite, 2018). Briefly, 
opt-outs seem to have worked reasonably well in Denmark but led in the UK to a 
drift into the Brexit catastrophe.21 It does not help, of course, that two of the most 
salient common policies, monetary union and Schengen, have turned out to be 
particularly contentious. Whatever one’s view of opt-outs (and mine is shaped by 
the disastrous outcome in the UK; see also Brunkhorst, 2018), Scharpf is surely right 
that an agreed common policy in relation to them would be preferable to the ad-hoc 
arrangements that have been seen so far, and that are to some extent constitutionalised 
in the OMC.22 Tanja Börzel (2018: 478), attempting to counter over-pessimistic 
diagnoses of the future of the EU, argues that ‘differentiated integration should not 
be equated with disintegration’.23
This discussion followed something of a trend in the previous few years. Jan Zielonka 
(2014) asked ‘Is the EU doomed?’, suggesting that it might ‘muddle through’ in a 
mixed or ‘polyphonious’ series of uneven developments (see also Zielonka, 2017). 
Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs (2016: 43) {Not in References} suggested 
plausibly that the more the EU integrated what they called ‘core state powers’ such 
as ‘money and fiscal affairs, defence and foreign policy, migration, citizenship and 
internal security’, the more it intruded on the domain of state elites rather than the 
business elites affected by market integration.24 While the latter tended to welcome 
integration (as seen more recently in their response to the prospect of Brexit), the latter 
{former? i.e. state elites} tend to see the expansion of EU capacities as a threat to 
their domain of activity, in a logic described over a century ago by Otto Hintze and 
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8
Max Weber, who stressed the corporate interest of state elites as a determinant of 
state policy. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2016: 55) {Not in References} conclude: 
‘Perhaps ironically, the more involved the EU is in the exercise of core state powers, 
the less it looks like a state: more integration, less federation!’
Both Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation may be seen to destabilise the existing 
constitutional arrangements of member states. Europeanisation offers opportunities 
for subnational entities to engage directly with transnational structures, bypassing or 
acting alongside their national governments. Macro-regional planning, for example, 
has been perceived as a threat by several states in the Danube region, which has seen 
attempts to reassert national control (Ágh 2016; Sielker 2017). De-Europeanisation, 
as in the prospective British case, has also raised issues about where the powers over, 
for example, agriculture, currently located at the EU level, should end up after the 
UK’s eventual (hopefully in the continental sense rather than the English one {unsure 
what this means}) secession. At present much agricultural policy is devolved by 
the UK to the regional governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This 
may seem a purely UK problem but the British case has, here as elsewhere, a much 
more general significance, demonstrating the insuperable obstacles to disentangling 
the links formed by membership, even for a state outside the eurozone and the 
Schengen area (Wiener 2017) {Not in References}. Although it has not, or not 
yet, given a decisive impetus to Scottish independence, it has put the UK’s devolution 
arrangements under serious strain, and would probably have done so even without 
the spectacularly insensitive postures adopted by the Brexit government. It has also 
threatened to marginalise the UK Parliament and its judiciary – in the latter case 
throwing up possible parallels with the situations in Poland and Hungary. The UK 
remains politically polarised on the issue in roughly equal proportions, resembling 
those in Poland, the US or Turkey.
All this means that de-Europeanisation à l’anglaise is likely to remain a negative 
example for other member states, as Vollaard (2014) anticipated. A more likely 
outcome is a further extension of policies that do not directly challenge the EU but 
attempt to evade or dilute its arrangements (Zhelyazkova, 2014). There are perhaps 
parallels with Colin Crouch’s conception of postdemocracy, in which democracy 
is not replaced in a Nazi-style seizure of power (Machtergreifung) but is undermined 
in more surreptitious ways (Ágh, 2015). The kinds of accommodations and policy 
bargains discussed in the context of Europeanisation25 may also be relevant in relation 
to de-Europeanisation. Strategies of this kind on the part of member states would 
complement a drift of the EU itself away from transnational approaches in a further 
development of the OMC and the ‘executive federalism’ to which Habermas drew 
attention earlier in this decade. As Attila Ágh (2017) has pointed out, the EU has 
also tended to focus increasingly on its own core, ignoring the fragmentation of its 
periphery.26
Whether this softening is a permanent change of course for the European polity or 
merely part of the back-and-forth movement that it has always displayed, and which 
is a regular feature even of more consolidated federal systems, remains to be seen (see 
Kelemen, 2007; Bednar, 2009). Survey evidence suggests that European opinion tends 
to favour a more flexible and selective approach in which a less transnational EU, 
with more popular input through referendums, focuses mainly on peace and security 
issues as well as the promotion of economic growth rather than energy security or 
climate change27 (de Vries, 2018: 190-193). de Vries differentiates usefully between 
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four attitudes to the EU: loyalists, regime sceptics, policy sceptics and exit sceptics, 
and also between those in states with relatively good or poor economic conditions. 
(See also Otjes and Katsanidou, 2017.) There seems to be no support for the most 
dramatic form of narrowing: the return to a much smaller Europe of six or fifteen. 
Overall, however, it is hard to disagree with Philippe Huberdeau’s (2017) conclusion 
that European integration is not irreversible.
The central issue will probably be the future development of the eurozone, which is 
widely agreed to require tighter coordination.28 In one scenario, then, this drives the 
EU as a whole (along with a couple of Nordic refuseniks and some laggards) in a more 
federal direction along the lines argued for by Anthony Giddens (2013) – whether 
or not this is particularly welcome to European publics. Alternatively, the eurozone, 
if it survives, might constitute a permanent core of the Union, with a much larger 
and more fragmented outer circle. This second scenario might come to be seen as 
a realistic accommodation to political necessity, in a context increasingly dominated 
by nationalism and xenophobia, or as a seriously damaging de-Europeanisation. 
European integration began at a time when this kind of nationalist politics had just 
wrecked the continent, and we have to confront the possibility that it may succumb 
to it again. As Gerard Delanty (2019: 426–427) {Not in References} writes in the 
conclusion to the new edition of his Formations of European Modernity,
To defend Europe in this climate of uncertainty is to defend the social 
against the destructive forces of globalization and the dismantling of the 
institutions and structures of political community and solidarity that have 
been an integral part of European modernity.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Pannonia Summer 
School in Köszeg, Hungary and at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. I am grateful 
also for comments by David Spence and Pierre Vimont, and to Alex Callinicos and 
other participants at the London conference.
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Notes
1  This title is a reference to the EU slogan of widening (enlargement) and deepening 
(integration). The current explosion of populism and political polarisation creates 
particular problems for the EU, which is largely based on argumentation, consensus 
and compromise.
2  On the difference between the emergent polity of the EU and other forms of 
international cooperation, see for example Lavdas (2010).
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3  For a recent expert assessment, see Rogers (2018). Government statements later became 
a little more conciliatory (or resigned) on the issue of EU standards. On Europeanisation 
and human rights, see Schuldt (2018).
4  www.opendemocracy.net/uk/adam-ramsay/tory-ministers-taxpayer-cash-hard-Brexit-
erg. More recently a police spokesman has admitted that ‘political sensitivities’ are 
delaying its investigation of criminality in the Leave campaign: www.opendemocracy.
net/uk/brexitinc/james-cusick-adam-ramsay/met-police-stall-brexit-campaign-
investigations-claiming-polit
5  This was in fact a revision of the more negative judgement of 1974 known as Solange 
I.
6  As Ernst Haas (1970: 611) repeated in his retrospective article, ‘I consider it 
[Europeanisation] a process for the creation of political communities defined in 
institutional and attitudinal terms’ (my emphasis). For a useful overview, see Anders et 
al (2016).
7  Jan Grzymski has pointed out that the veteran public intellectual Jadwiga Staniszkis 
coined the term ‘anti-communist bolshevism’ with regard to the Law and Justice 
government in Poland; see https://discoversociety.org/2016/06/01/poland-en-route-
to-authoritarianism/. On the details of the Polish situation, see also Sanders and von 
Danwitz (2018). See also the related analysis, based on a comparison of Serbia and 
Bulgaria but of more general relevance, in Dawson 2014.
8  In an interesting example of the intersection of two varieties of de-Europeanisation, 
Ágh (2017: 9) notes that the UK was prominent in blocking the strengthening of 
the rule of law framework. This was repeated in June 2018 when UK Conservative 
MEPs voted against sanctioning Hungary. As a member of the civil liberties committee, 
Sophie in ‘t Veld, commented, ‘Voting with Orbán is the true Tory Brexit: the exit 
from European values.’ (www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/25/mep-european-
parliament-vote-eu-sanction-hungary-viktor-orban). What Ágh (2016a) had earlier 
described as the ‘Rocky Road of Europeanization’ looks increasingly like a rocky 
horror show. The analysis by Rupnik and Zielonka (2013) remains relevant; see also 
Körtvélyesi and Majtényi (2017); Pazderski (2018).
9  See for example Bruszt and Holzhacker (2009); Habermas (2017).
10  In the UK, a court judgement requiring the government to consult Parliament on 
its Article 50 notification led to the judges being branded ‘enemies of the people’ in 
a newspaper article. The government has also been aiming to secure powers to revise 
legislation without reference to Parliament and to reconfigure the UK’s devolution 
arrangements. For an excellent discussion of the determinants of the UK’s Brexit 
negotiating position, see Martill and Steiger (2018). Since, at the time of writing the 
outcome of the Brexit negotiations is still open and I have been criticised for over-
emphasising the ignorance, stupidity and wickedness of the UK government, it is 
worth stressing the extent of the damage which it has caused to the UK’s image. (In 
fairness I should admit that this is balanced by expressions of admiration in extreme 
right circles.)
11  See also Gad 2016 {Not in References} and Adler-Nissen and Gad 2013 {Not in 
References}.The parallels with Scotland’s reverse situation of being prospectively 
dragged out of the EU by the UK have been explored in some detail by Gad {Not 
in References}, who has argued that ‘sovereignty games’ may open up options for 
Scotland short of full independence.
12  Like Iceland, its emergence as an independent state is quite recent (1905).
13  For a more positive recent official assessment see Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (2018).
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14  This contrasts interestingly with last century’s joke that in the 21st century, Europe 
would be made up of the following states: the European Union, the six republics of 
Yugoslavia, and Finland.
15  The euro operates also as a form of weak Europeanisation in those parts of the Western 
Balkans and Northern Ireland where it circulates as a secondary currency.
16  On the other hand, Sieglinde Gstöhl (2002: 214) {Not in References} suggests, in 
her comparison of the three countries, that ‘Norway and Switzerland had to cope 
with much stronger domestic constraints and more issues of national identity than did 
Sweden.’ On ‘Alpine’ political culture, see Caramani (2005). On Norway as a (probably 
unattainable) model for the UK, see Fossum and Graver (2018).
17  For a Swiss overview, see ‘Switzerland and the European Union’: www.eda.admin.
ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/EuropaeischeAngelegenheiten/Schweiz-
und-EU_en.pdf. The proposed treaty between Switzerland and the EU now seems 
dead, since both major parties have come out against it: www.nzz.ch/schweiz/die-
europapolitik-der-schweiz-die-wichtigsten-aspekte-im-ueberblick-ld.1358995
18 The EU is not alone in constitutionalising economic policy matters: Article 53 of the 
Italian constitution decrees that ‘the tax system shall be progressive’.
19  For useful recent discussions of European inequalities, see the special issue of Actes de 
la recherche en sciences sociales, No. 219, 2017; also Hugrée et al (2017).
20  On dis-integration, see also Eppler and Scheller (2013); Scheller and Eppler (2014).
21  See Vimont (2018). Although the UK may have gained in the short term from opting 
out of the euro (since its economic management would probably have been no less 
incompetent than that of Ireland and had similar results) and Schengen (given its island 
location), these would have bound the population more closely into the EU and made 
the prospect of leaving it seem more consequential than abandoning an unused credit 
card or gym membership. Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2015: 13) {Not in References 
– there is a 2016 publication} noted ‘the excessively high costs of defecting’ from 
monetary integration; Vollaard’s model also stresses this dimension.
22  Christopher Lord (2015) pointed to the advantages of differentiation where the 
resulting negative externalities are relatively insignificant, and Richard Bellamy and 
Sandra Kröger (2017) defend differentiated integration in a Union of demoi.
23  On dis-integration, see Schmitter (2012), Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2014) {Not in 
References – there is a 2016 publication listed}, Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016), 
Rosamond (2017) {Not in References – 2016?}. Scharpf (2016), however, calls 
for the dis-integration of the eurozone, pointing to ‘the costs of non-disintegration’. 
Majone (2014) suggests that integration may have gone too far.
24  On citizenship, see Seubert et al (2018).
25  See for instance Taylor et al (2013).
26  For an argument that the EU should intervene more vigorously in protecting the rule 
of law in its member states, ‘de-fragmenting’ itself in the sense used of a computer disk, 
see Perju (2018).
27  It is of course not clear how economic prosperity can be safeguarded without 
coordinated action on climate change, and the sort of social policy approach which 
the Union has largely failed to pursue (Walby, 2018).
28  See, for instance, Rodrik (2018).
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